

## **Strategic Stability in South Asia**

### **Course Rationale**

1. South Asian arch rivals, India and Pakistan have one of the most enduring rivalries in the world. Nuclearization of South Asia has by no means brought any relief to its people in terms of reducing tension or resolving the protracted conflicts between India and Pakistan. Rather, the frequency of conflicts and crises continued to grow without any progress on any of the disputes. The bilateral relations between the South Asian nuclear neighbours, India and Pakistan have reached the lowest ebb. Diplomatic presence is at the lowest level, and there is no trade or talk on any aspect of the relationship. In fact, the possibility of a limited military engagement existed since the Kargil Conflict with varying degrees of probability. However, India's unilateral actions of August 5, 2019 have decolonized the decades-old Kashmir conflict, thereby increasing the probability of a military engagement, like the February 26-27, 2019 events leading to an unthinkable nuclear exchange, no matter how limited it is. Therefore, the efficacy of deterrent stability in an environment of increasing conventional asymmetry and increased economic disparity between India and Pakistan, which is tilted heavily in favour of India, needs to be analyzed. Based on these analyses, the probabilities of any future wars, conflicts, and crises due to deterrence failure or dilution are determined and possibilities of peace in the presence of unresolved disputes are examined.

### **Educational Objectives**

2. The new course will offer an opportunity to the scholars for a rational analysis of the prevalent environment in South Asia. This would help them determine the efficacy of the deterrence regime to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.

### **Input Obtained from Industry/Corporate Sector/Subject Specialists/Academia**

3. The course is prepared and based on the curriculum being taught at other universities in Pakistan.

### **International Practice**

4. All the leading universities around the world are keenly conducting the courses on South Asia Strategic Stability, due to the impending failure of the deterrence regime.

a. The University of Adelaide, <https://www.adelaide.edu.au/course-outlines/107093/1/sem-2/2018/>

### **Proposed Timeframe of Commencement**

5. Specifying semester with year.

The course is proposed for the Fall 2022 as part of the elective courses to be taught at CIPS.

### **Course Contents**

6. Give details of the course, on the following lines:

a. **Course Code:** SS-801

b. **Title:** Strategic Stability in South Asia

c. **Credit Hours:** 3hrs

d. **Objectives.** To understand the Dynamics of Strategic Stability in South Asia. Emphasize on developing strategic knowledge, creative thinking, analytical skills, and reflection.

e. **Outcomes.** The students of this course should be able to:

(1) Understand the complexities of India-Pakistan relations

(2) Investigate the causes and effects of impending military engagements between India and Pakistan.

(3) Analyze factors affecting strategic stability in South Asia.

f. **Contents with suggested contact hours:** This will be a 16 classes \*3hrs = 48 credit hours course.

(1) South Asia Security Environment (4 x Classes)

a. Historical Review of the situation

b. Analysis of Current South Asian Security Dynamics

(2) Factors affecting South Asian Strategic Stability (4x Classes)

a. Ideological

b. Territorial

c. Water

(3) Nuclear Politics: Deterrence, Compellence (4 x Classes)

a. Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence

b. India's Strategy of Compellence

c. Pakistan's All Spectrum Deterrence

(4) The Way Forward (4 x Classes)

a. Options for India

b. Options for Pakistan

c. Responsibility of UN

d. US interests in Stable South Asia

**g. Recommended Reading (including Textbooks and Reference books).**

(1) Ahmer, Moonis, eds. *Conflict Resolution Research in South Asia*. Karachi: Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, 2010.

(2) Basrur, Rajesh. *Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

(3) Chakma, Bhumitra. *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons*. London: Routledge, 2009.

(4) Cheema, Zafar Iqbal. *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010.

(5) Delpech, Therese. *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012.

(6) Ganguly, Sumit. *Conflict Unending; India-Pakistan Tension since 1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

(7) Ganguly, Sumit, and Kapoor S. Paul. *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating the Nuclear Stability in South Asia*. New Delhi: Viking Penguin, 2010.

(8) Khan Saira. *Nuclear weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan*. London: Routledge, 2009.

(9) Khan, Zulfqar. ed. *Nuclear Pakistan; Strategic Dimension*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

(10) Lavoy, Peter R. ed. *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

(11) Paul, T.V. *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

(12) Perkovich, George. *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation*, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1999.

(13) Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.

(14) Sagen, D. Scott. ed. *Inside Nuclear South Asia*. London: Stanford University Press, 2009.

(15) Basrur, Rajesh M. "International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence." *India Review* 4, no. 2, April 2005.

(16) Salik, Naeem *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, Oxford University Press, 2010

(17) Shamsi, Zia Ul Haque. *Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan*, New York: Peter Lang, 2020.

(18) Yamin, Tughral *The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia* Pakistan Army Press, 2014

h. Details of lab work, workshops practice (if applicable). NA